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Low and middle income countries (LMICs), as well 
as high income countries (HICs), with different political-
economic contexts, varying dependence on external 
financing, as well as in differentiated stages of development 
of primary health care (PHC), have adopted payment for 
performance or performance-based financing programs 
(P4P/PBF). Addressing the reality of different health 
systems and contexts, in LMICs and HICs, the rational-
based assumptions supporting the design of P4P/PBF 
programmes have been theoretically questioned by 
more realistic political, organizational and motivational 
assumptions. Empirically, they have been challenged by 
alternative logics and processes arising from comparatively 
distinctive implementation and (re)formulation processes, 
diverse unexpected effects/evidence and a recognition 
of the need to consider adaptations and long-term 
(sustainable) impacts on health systems.  Consequently, 
1  We are grateful to Germano Coelho and Jaqueline Dama-
sceno for their help in the edition of this introduction.
2  Fabiana da Cunha Saddi is a British Academy Newton Ad-
vanced Fellow, together with Stephen Peckham, and Visiting 
Research Fellow at the University of Kent.
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P4P/PBF programs have been subject to social sciences, public policy, health policy 
and health systems research.  These analyses have the potential to significantly enrich 
the debate and knowledge on the operation and impact of P4P/PBF programs and 
how they could be more effectively designed to support health system performance and 
strengthening, producing effective/real-world or long-term improvements.
This special issue entitled “Pay for performance, formulation, implementation and 
policy success” includes papers from LMICs, as well as a translation of a paper about the 
Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) adopted in England/United Kingdom. This 
issue brings together the Brazilian and international knowledge about P4P/PBF, being 
firstly (but not only) motivated by a relevant gap in the Brazilian literature regarding the 
National Programme for Improving Primary Care Access and Quality (PMAQ), which 
are predominantly quantitative, using official data (SADDI; PECKHAM, 2018). Given the 
wide variety of programs in HICs and LMICs with individual countries designing and 
implementing programs the discussion in this issue of the journal provides an opportunity 
for comparative assessment of programs. 
P4P/PBF programs can be broadly defined as a mechanism through which health 
providers can be partially financed and/or health professionals receive financial incentives 
based on their performance. In most low-income countries (LICs), P4P programs are 
known as performance-based financing (PBF). They require the execution of contracts 
with health units already in operation under the responsibility of governments. The PBF, 
in its initial phase - or generation - is not yet included as part of the national reform of 
the country’s health system. The PBF was designed by a group of experts (FRITSCHE; 
SOETERS; MEESSEN, 2014), originated in Cambodia, being subsequently incorporated 
by the World Bank and other funding agencies who began to support the program at the 
time the program was being launched in Africa. 
In a middle-income country, such as Brazil, the PMAQ is a national program, prepared 
by the formulators of the Department of Basic Attention of the Ministry of Health. It 
began in the context of fiscal constriction when the need to improve the Family Health 
Strategy evaluation was necessary in order to guarantee and justify increased funding for 
basic care (SADDI; PÊGO, 2018). In the UK QOF formed part of a new national contract 
for GPs introduced in 2004 as a response to years of underinvestment in general practice 
compared with other parts of the health service, low morale among GPs, and variations 
in the quality of primary medical care. While it was voluntary to participate the vast 
majority of practices took up the opportunity for additional income. Common to most 
schemes/countries is a focus on improving primary health care, ensuring comparable 
national, regional and local standards of quality. In LMICs they also aim to improve 
access to services. In LICs, they can also target the reconstruction of health systems or 
improvement of epidemic or basic health indicators.
Brazil and African countries have, or are, developing community-oriented primary 
care, working with health teams composed of doctors, nurses and community health 
workers (CHW). In African countries, there is a range of integration of CHW into their 
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health services - even though the involvement of CHW is considered an important driver 
in the implementation of PBF and PHC, as happened in Rwanda. In Brazil, where the 
development of a community model in PHC is more advanced, given the expansion of 
Family Health Strategy (FHS) in the country, PMAQ/P4P has not successfully managed 
to include the work of CHW during its implementation (SADDI et al., 2017 and 2018). 
In England, the QOF is linked to the work of the general practitioner and their contracted 
services. 
With respect to the formulation and design process, P4P/PBF is still poorly 
studied around the world. In LICs, this is possibly because the formulation does not 
initially occur in the country or is not led by the government. A study carried out 
in 12 countries presents some facilities and barriers to progress towards the national 
adoption and institutionalization phases of the PBF (SHROFF, BIGDELI; MEESSEN, 
2017). Systematic review and analysis, although in different ways, either draw attention 
to the need to take into account the contexts and design (EIJKENAAR, 2013; PAUL 
et al., 2018; RENMANS et al., 2016), or give emphasis to varied actors and relations 
and questions that frame the national ownership of the program and can influence its 
formulation (GAUTIER; RIDDE, 2017). All of them focus on the role that needs to be 
played by national actors. 
In the Brazilian case, we know that the programme was discussed between 
formulators and members of health councils, and that they reached a consensus in order 
to have its approval by the Three-parties Health Commission (SADDI; PÊGO, 2018). 
However we do not yet know in a more analytical and in-depth way, how the PMAQ 
formulation/(re)design process occurred in its different rounds, and how national actors 
– researchers, council members and other - and few international experts have been 
involved in formulating and influencing its design. In England various analyses and 
commentaries by academic researchers, consultancies, health professional pressure groups, 
and committees have been examining the impact and process of the QOF. Recent research 
studies (FORBES; MARCHAND; PECKHAM, 2016; GRUTHRIE; TANG, 2016), and 
an NHS analysis (NATIONAL HEALTH SYSTEM ENGLAND, 2018), question the 
value and the future continuation  of the program. Even though, we have not yet located 
a study focused on the policymaking process of QOF since 2004.
Regarding the implementation, themes such as organizational capacity, staff 
engagement, professional motivations, stress and work overload are also extensively 
considered in both HIC (GRUTHRIE; TANG, 2016; PECKHAM, 2007) and LMICs 
(EIJKENAAR, 2013; RENMANS et al, 2016; SADDI et al, 2018; TOONEN et al., 
2009). Though in varied ways between LMI and HI countries, researchers/analyses have 
taken unintended consequences into account, such as gaming and cheating in Brazil 
(SADDI et al., 2017), perverse effects in African countries (PAUL et al., 2018), and 
Bureaucratisation, clinical autonomy and professionalism, crowding out and gaming in 
the UK (GRUTHRIE; TANG, 2016). 
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Considering that P4P/PBF is focused mainly or only on a group of quality criteria 
and indicators that can be easily measured, researches have also been questioning the 
ways that policy impact and success have been measured and prevalent in the literature. 
Though in diverse ways, researchers from both HIC (PECKHAM; WALLACE, 2010) 
and LMICs have questioned whether P4P/PBF has affected health workers and local 
health organisations and whether it has affected the quality of the activities incentivised, 
areas not targeted by the program or the overall quality of primary care. Evidence in 
terms of PBF effectiveness and efficiency is mixed among countries, researchers have 
either shown or analytically stressed the fact that there is no evidence that PBF is a 
pro-poor strategy and that it would need equity targets (SKILLES et al., 2013). This 
refers to an emergent consensus in LICs (RIDDE et al., 2018) and an incipient debate 
related to the PMAQ in Brazil. In LICs analysis/debate also takes place either around 
the need to rethink the scheme (PAUL et al., 2018), or as a strategy/tool catalyst towards 
comprehensive health reform (FRITSCHE; SOETERS; MEESSEN, 2014) or that 
can move towards its institutionalization in health systems and depending on barriers/
facilitators (SHROFF; BIGDELI; MEESSEN, 2017). Evidence from the early years of the 
QOF suggested it reduced variations between practices in the delivery of incentivised 
interventions, and contributed to progress towards better use of electronic records and 
nurse-led multidisciplinary care of long-term conditions. However, after the first year 
of the QOF, most practices achieved near-maximum remuneration from the scheme 
raising questions about its value and each year adjustments were made to the measures 
with many now “retired”. More recently the scheme has been dropped in Scotland and 
there is increasing variation in its application in England with the possibility its use will 
be dropped nationwide although data on areas of care  that were in QOF will continue 
to be monitored but not necessarily incentivised financially. 
The papers included in this issue can be seen as relevant cases of the current state of 
knowledge of the different political-economic contexts. Pierre Abomo, in his discussion 
paper, draws attention to the fact that the PBF literature has not yet sufficiently explored 
the implications for the ideological and operational changes that the PBF is causing. He 
introduces the concept of “depoliticization” in the PBF debate in Africa, and in particular 
in the case of Cameroon, to describe the capacity of PBF to redesign a health policy. His 
analysis takes into account not only political and state intervention, but also the primacy 
of the public sector in relation to the market competition field where the sponsored 
Government and non-state actors are located. The author recommends that PBF should 
be rethought in relation to its design, introduction and implementation, incorporating 
national actors in the design of the tool and definition of objectives and indicators. He 
argues that PBF, as proposed by external actors, needs to be immersed in the country’s 
practice and formulation process.
Lara Gautier and Valéry Ridde, perform a documentary analysis of the World Bank-
administrated Health Results Innovation Trust Fund (HRITF) learning agenda over 
ten years, when the impact evaluations of PBF pilot programs adopted in PRBM was 
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predominant. The authors show that HRITF’s productions/actions have produced both 
a form of politicized knowledge and a transformative use of knowledge in the area, 
given how both the design and evaluation of the pilot projects financed by the Fund 
took place. Authors highlight diverse learning activities have resulted in a transformative 
use of knowledge for World Bank staff, national policy makers and implementers, and 
recommend that the institution needs to move forward to become a transformative 
learning organization.
Larissa Lemos, Nília Prado and Maria Guadalupe Medina present a systematization 
of the concepts that frame the design of PMAQ/Brazil. This systematization highlights 
the logical plausibility of the proposal. It shows how new evaluations could focus on 
organizational issues, and make comparison between the program designed and its 
implementation in the municipalities. This work is politically relevant to the current state 
of knowledge of the PMAQ in Brazil, because it brings elements that will enable the 
development and deepening of questions regarding not only the implementation process, 
but especially the redesign and reformulation process of the program.
The paper by Jessica Gergen, Yogesh Rajkotia and Nirmala Ravishankar contribute 
to the debate about whether the PBF constitutes a mechanism capable of producing 
broad transformations in health systems. The authors use qualitative methods to analyse 
the implementation of PBF in health units, verifying how the PBF promoted positive, 
perverse and disruptive effects on the health system in two provinces of Mozambique. 
Among the positive results are the increase of the autonomy, local fiscal capacity and 
planning. Among the negative aspects, are the fact that the allocation of incentives among 
employees was unfair and without transparency, the increase in workload and time spent 
with data in the information system, in detriment of clinical care. The study shows that 
the persistence of positive results will depend on the institutionalization of changes in 
governance, management structures and fiscal autonomy, together with efforts to increase 
the inclusiveness of the demand-side.
Thabata Zermiani, Marcia Pinto and Rafael Ditterich conduct a qualitative and 
quantitative study to analyse the perception of health workers in Curitiba between 
2002-2015, in Brazil, during the implementation of the Quality Development Incentive 
Program (IDQ), adopted by the Municipal Health Secretariat. Authors show that the 
incentive initially had positive results motivating health professionals, affecting the quality 
of work and achievement of goals. However, over time the evaluation became a routine, 
not being performed in the way it was theoretically advocated. The evaluation process, 
the prioritization of the quantity, the fraud of information to reach the goals and the fact 
that incentives were used as a manoeuvre to not increase the salaries were considered 
in the study as barriers to the implementation of the program. In the self-assessment, 
for example, professionals rarely gave a score below ten. Among the main lessons of the 
study, authors emphasize that performance programs should be transparent and impartial, 
promote dialogue between professionals and enable managers and professionals to 
appropriate all stages of agreement, so that there would be an effective impact on quality 
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and results achieved. This study brings lessons that should be considered in the analysis of 
PMAQ and are in line with other few implementation studies about PMAQ.
Alline Orué, Albert Souza, Alcindo Ferla, Débora Nascimento and Mara Santos use 
official secondary data from the second round of PMAQ to analyse the implementation, 
planning and monitoring of the Family Health Support Center (NASF). Data showed 
that the NASF was implemented without proper articulation with PHC, centralized in 
management, mainly in capitals. It also showed that planning was organized, periodic and 
articulated. Authors point out that monitoring is still underdeveloped, with the exception of 
PMAQ, which induces activities through financial incentive and enables monitoring. This 
study exemplifies how the PMAQ data has been used around the country, and in various 
ways, to analyse or monitor processes related to Brazilian PHC, resulting in thousands and 
several works on Brazilian PHC. They are not, however, employed to analyse the proper 
implementation of the PMAQ or aspects strictly concerned with P4P themes.
Martin Roland and Frede Olesen in the article “Pay for Performance can improve 
the quality of primary health care?”, originally published in the BMJ and translated into 
Portuguese in this issue, explore what other countries can learn from the Quality and 
Outcomes Framework (QOF) experience of the United Kingdom. The authors provide 
lessons on how quality of care has been and should be measured, and on who should decide 
which indicators to adopt. They also question the fact that physicians should not exclude 
patients because of program targets and thus question whether performance is the most 
helpful way to pay doctors. They also reflect on how often a P4P scheme should be reviewed 
and point out the role of unintended consequences to practitioners and formulators/
managers. These are themes that have characterized the adoption of QOF, but which are 
common to P4P/PBF in other parts of the globe, bringing light on the formulation and 
implementation processes in countries adopting community-based models in PHC.
A entrevista com James Macinko, concedida à Fabiana C. Saddi, sistematiza o 
conhecimento/opinião de estudioso renomado da área, lançando
The interview with James Macinko, carried out by Fabiana C. Saddi, systematizes 
the knowledge and opinion of a renowned scholar, shedding lights on processes and 
topics and politically relevant sub-themes at this stage of PMAQ in Brazil. Macinko 
talks about the origin and relevance of the PMAQ, as well as of incentive initiatives that 
preceded the program. He also answers questions about results produced to date, lessons 
learned/recommendations to move forward with PMAQ and risks that may arise from 
the introduction of P4P into the national health system. Finally, the interviewee points out 
how the Brazilian Social Sciences could contribute to increase our knowledge about the 
PMAQ. Among the main sub-themes highlighted are the facts that municipalities with 
better resources may be able to earn incentive payments; the increase in data on PHC and 
its use for various purposes; the need to make the current method of data collection more 
transparent and independent, to better understand how incentive payments are actually 
being used and to communicate the work of the FHS to users and policymakers.
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